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COMMON RIGHT, DUE PROCESS AND ANTITRUST 
WALTON HAMILTON* 
The Sherman Act1 is the great charter of American industry.2 It is the dementary 
ordinance about which the pattern of the public control of business has been woven. 
It expresses the general ru1e, against which other statutes are elaboration, qu!tlifica-
tion, exception, accommodation to circumstance. 
Over the centuries this fabric of control has been woven. Public policy, the com-
mon law, usages of trade, statutes of the realm, opinion popular and unpopular, 
decrees of judges have all left their impress upon it. As industry has evolved, as 
necessities have become evident, as ways of thought have changed, the process has 
continued. The larger adjustment has been made by the legislature; the detail has 
been worked out by the courts. The law of industry is the cumulative ,result of count-
less expediencies shaped· to countless occasions, a corpus distilled from myriads of 
decisions about everyday matters. Along a score of fronts its heritage of abstraction 
meets concrete situations and in the impact each is remade by the other. Its trim 
and tangled actuality is a product rather of the years than of intent. As a design it 
reveals a sprawling trimness, an order at peace with confusion, a surge towards 
diverse objectives. It has a beauty, a relevancy, an intricacy, an arresting quality 
which no blue print come to life could ever possess. Its logic is the logic of things 
that grow. 
If one. must be technical, the Sherman Act dates from x8go. The year marks the 
occasion upon which the ancient law received formal expression in a federal statute. 
Its translation from common law to Act of Congress was long overdue. As the 
national economy was transformed by the coming of the machine, the balance sheet, 
and the corporation, the pinch of transition was widely felt. A restriction of oppor-
tunity, a blocking of the channels of trade, an interference with the right of the 
individual to his calling became matters of .common complaint. Farmers were per-
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1 26 STAT. 209 (1890); 15 U. S. C. §§1·7· . 
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suaded that they were selling corn, hogs, wheat, cattle, tobacco, cotton to buyers 
who were acting in concert. Consumers were convinced that in the purchase of 
sugar, nails, copper, jute, cordage, borax, slate pencils, oil cloth, gutta percha, barbed 
wire fence they encountered "the thumbscrew of monopoly." The little feller knew 
for a certainty that he was being crowded to the wall by "the squeeze play," against 
which there was, or ought to be, a law.3 The Robber Barons, seizing the chance 
which mechanical invention had brought, were putting together their industrial 
domains. Such matters clearly lay beyond the competence of the several states; the 
Congress was continuously appealed to for a redress of grievances. All through the 
eighties the issue provoked increasing debate. By the Fifty-first Congress it was no 
longer to be denied. 
In the Senate an act slowly took shape. A number of bills-unlike in objective, 
substance, procedure, range, remedy-indicated the insistent demand for legislation. 
After long deliberation the Finance Committee reported favorably in amended form 
a bill introduced by Senator John Sherman.4 It declared "all arrangements, contracts, 
trusts, or combinations made with the intention "to prevent full and free competition" 
or "to advance the cost to the consumer" to be "against public policy, unlawful and 
void." It provided that any person "injured or damnified" by such an act might sue 
for and recover "twice the amount of the damages sustained and the cost of the suit." 
An addendum to the original measure conferred upon the circuit courts of the 
United States "original jurisdiction of all suits of a civil nature or at equity" which 
might result. It likewise directed the Attorney General and the several district attor-
neys "to prosecute all such cases to final judgment and execution."5 
For the real crusaders in the Senate this was far too mild a measure. Senator 
Reagan, of Texas, had gone trust-busting over the wide open spaces, and he thought 
he knew a criminal when he saw orre. So, first as a substitute, later as an amendment, 
he offered his own bill. In rather severe terms it defined a "trust" as "a combination 
of capital, skill or acts" by which two or more persons "create or carry out any restric-
tions in trade"; made all persons who were parties to such a trust "guilty of a high 
misdemeanor"; and specified that each day tainted with a violation should be treated 
as a "separate offense."6 In like manner Senator Ingalls, conscious of the ills of the 
Great Middle West, proposed a substitute which he likewise converted into an 
amendment. In an elaboration of definition, penalty and detail it sought "the pre-
venting and suppressing, so far as may be," of deals in futures in agricultural prod-
ucts. Although as substitutes they were unacceptable, as amendments they were 
welcome; and with a will the upper house added them to the measure before it. It 
quickly became apparent that two such tails were far too much for the original kite. 
Thereupon this omnibus act was recommitted-not to the Finance Committee 
whence the pristine measure had come-but to the Judiciary Committee. 
Within six days the Judiciary Committee returned to the Senate the bill-or 
• 21 CoNG. REc., passim (x889). • 21 CoNG. REc. 96 (x889). 
• S. 1, Calendar No. 14, 51st Cong., xst Sess. (1889). 
e Ibid. 
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rather a different bill. It had struck out all the lines that followed "be it enacted" 
and in their stead had written its own text. Vestiges survive in the remedies set down 
-the criminal action, the plea in equity, the private suit for dama,ges. Otherwise 
the bill, discfaiming all novelty, does no more than recite for the federal jurisdiction 
the rules of the common law against restraint and monopoly.7 To many senators it 
was a matter of regret that the proposed draft was not addressed more particularly 
to "trusts," to "giant octopi," to ''huge aggregates of capitalistic power" which were 
becoming a menace to "the comfort of ordinary life" and to "republican institutions." 
But the Judi~iary Committee wanted to go warily "in entering upon a new and 
untrodden field of legislation." In undertaking to curb by national authority an evil 
which hitherto had been left to the states, it was loath to alter the established trends of 
legal tolerance. Senator Edmunds, for the Committee, explained that the inbent was 
to make the "definition out of terms that were known to the law already." Senator 
Hoar-who drafted the measure that bears the name of ~s colleague from Ohio8-
stated that "we have affirmed the old doctrine of the common law in regard to all 
interstate a~d int~national transactions."9 Later, in debate, he remarked, "the great 
thing that this bill does, except affording a remedy, is to extend to the federal juris-
diction the common law principles which protected fair competition in trade in old 
times in England.''10 
Thus the bill repeated, rather than created, the law. Its principle hailed from the 
days of petty trade, its intent was to impose upon business the rule of competition. 
Its focus is a term of art, "restraint of trade," which has a clear legal significance. 
Its lines of legality, its range of offenses, its prohibitions upon conduct are all those 
of the common law. Its formal declaration was deemed necessary only because Con-
gress believed that there was no common law of the United States. A statute was 
necessary to establish for the federal jurisdiction sanctions which the several states 
enjoyeo without formal enactment. The bill had vicissitudes which left not even a 
dent on its structure; and in the form in which it was re-reported-or more strictly, 
initially reported-it passed both houses, received the President's signature, and as 
"the Sherman Act" became the law of the land. 
II 
A word about its development will throw into relief the character and sweep of 
this rule against restraints. Although it dates from "time immemorial" it came into 
the law in the period marked by the break-up of the gilds.11 It is, like the enveloping 
policy of the freedom of trade, an aspect of the national protest against the exclusive 
7 /hid. 
8 Senator George E. Hoar has said the act was called the Sherman, Act for no other reason than that 
Senator Sherman "had nothing to do.with framing it whatsoever." 2 HoAR, AUTOBIOGRAPHY oF SEVENTY 
YEARs (1903) 363. It is worthy of note that to John Sherman, Senator from Ohio, the Sherman Act was 
the Silver Purchase Act. 
• 21 CoNG. REc. 3146 (1890). 10 21 CoNo. REc. 3152 (1890). 
11 Note the authority of cases in Coke's Reports in the development of the doctrine. Its close affinity 
to the cause in which the learned jurist was enlisted is not to be overlooked. Note the common law cases 
cited below. 
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privileges enjoyed by these brotherhoods. In the law it was gradually elaborated out 
of judgments which emerged from actions brought under the ancient writs. At first 
the courts went no further than to refuse to entertain suits from persons who sought 
their help in creating or maintaining restraints. Thus a writ of trespass was refused 
to two schoolmasters who complained that a _third had set up shop in competition 
with them;12 and an action for trespass on the case was brought by the Prior of 
Dunstable against a butcher, who instead of patronizing the Prior's market and 
paying the stall fee, sold meats on a market day in his houseP In like manner a writ 
of debt sought by one John Dyer against a potential competitor who had obligated 
himself not to use "his art of a dyer's craft" within the town for half a year touched 
off the question of a restrictive covenant which ran against public policy.14 The 
writ of assumpsit was also held not to be available to one party who sought to hold 
another party to an agreement adjudged to be in restraint of trade.15 In time the 
courts refused to grant aid to the person seeking to enforce, and afforded a remedy to 
the person damaged by, a restrictive covenant. Thus out of such ancient writs, 
through acceptance or denial of causes of action, the doctrine of restraint emerged. 
The right to work became a fundamental tenet of the common law which a little 
later was declared to be above the King himself}-6 
The rule against restraints was not a creation of business enterprise. It took shape 
in a society dominated by petty trade. It came from days in which a pecuniary 
economy was in its early stages, the corporation little used, the techniques of acquisi-
tion still elementary, profits not yet an avowed end of adventure. The workaday 
world was still of the arts; the enterpriser, still a craftsman, was intent upon making 
a fair living for himsel£.17 Initially the rule had only a secondary concern with 
good, commodity, ware of trade. In a society ruled by handicraft, it is the skill of 
men of various trades which is of dominant concern at law and in public policy. 
The smith, the schoolmaster, the carrier, the barber-surgeon, plied their callings; 
the baker, the tailor, the dyer, the furrier received materials from their customers 
and to their "order" fashioned articles. The fabrication of wares for general sale in 
an impersonal market belonged to the future. The rule against restraints was an 
assertion that skills, occupations, mysteries, callings were affected with a public 
interest.18 
Little by little such initial steps were broadened into "the liberty of the subject 
to pursue lawful and established trades." At the common law "no man could be 
prohibited from working at any lawful trade, for the law abhors idleness, the mother 
12 The Schoolmaster's Case, Y. B. Hen. IV, f. 47, pl. 21 (1410). 
13 The Meat Market Case, Y. B. Hen. VI, f. 19, pl. 13; f. 25, pl. 2 (1433). 
u Dyer's Case, Y. B. 2 Hen. V. f. 5, pl. 26 (1415). 
15 Note, among others, an Anonymous Case, Moore II5, 72 Eng. Rep. 477 (1578), wherein a covenant 
by an apprentice not to engage in the craft of mercer in Nottingham for a period of four years was held 
invalid, and the Blacksmith's Case, 3 Leon. 217, 74 Eng. Rep. 643 (1587), where a bond given by one 
member of the fraternity to another not to ply his craft was held illegal. 
10 Statute of Monopolies, 21 JAc. I, ch. 3 (1623-24). 
17 AsHLEY, EcoNOMIC ORGANIZATION OF ENGLAND (1928) 36. 
18 Darcy v. Allen, n Coke 84b, 77 Eng. Rep. 1260 (K. B. 1602). 
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of all evil"; nor does the common law compel "the artificers and people of mystery" 
to "hold themselves everyone to one mystery" and "to no other than that which he 
has chosen."19 In fact the enjoyment of "a whole trade" by an individual is "malttm 
in se," so contrary to the common law that it cannot be justified even by a royal 
patent of monopoly.20 A landmark in the creation of the•rule involves the physician's 
calling. A patent granted by the King to the Royal College of Physicians in London 
had been confirmed by parliamentary act. Dr. Bonham, who had received a medical 
degree from the University of Cambridge, was refused admission to practice. Lord 
Coke found little difficulty in holding that the college had no legal authority to fine 
or imprison the le~rned doctor. His mo~t significant reason was that Dr. Bonham 
was a competent physician, and the chatter of the college, as confirmed by grant 
and statute, did not extend to the denia1 to a competent practitioner of his common 
right to the pursuit of his calling.21 This niling that the common law fixes the 
bounds of royal prerogative has become a milestone along the road that led to the 
liberties guaranteed by the Constitution. • 
The Statute of Monopolies served to underline anti to restate· the rule against re-
straints.22 It professed to do no more than declare "the ancient and fundamental 
law" of the realm. It recited the ban of old against "the sole buying, selling, mak-
ing, working or using of anything"; gave to any person or persons who might be 
"hindered, grieved, disturbed or disquieted" on pretext of a royal grant,, a right of 
action for threefold the amount of the damages and double the costs;28 and provided 
that all such suits should be "forever hereafter examined, heard, tried and determined 
by and according to the common laws of this· realm and n~t otherwise." In short, 
the Act gave a legislative statement to the rule against restraints, elevated the common 
law above the royal prerogative, and took from. the defense the right to plead a grant 
of monopoly in a suit at law.24 
As in England petty trade gave way to commerce, the common right went along. 
Privilege had been the life blood of the gild merchant. Its dominant reason for being 
was to preserve trade to its members; its charter gave it power to exclude those who 
were not of the franchise.25 The craft gild, its successor, likewise by virtue of a charter 
from Crown or municipality, had and held the exclusive practice of an art, but the 
1° Case of the Tailors of Ipswich, II Coke 53a, 77 Eng. Rep. 1218 (K. B. x6x4). 
20 Darcy v. Allen, II Coke 84b, 77 Eng. Rep. 1260 (K. B. 1602). 
21 Plucknett, Bonham's CaSt: and Judicial Revi~w (1926) 40 HARv. L. REv. 30; Corwin, T/1~ "Higher 
Law'' Background of American Constitutional Law (1929) 42 HARV. L. REv. 365; Thorne, Dr. Bonham's 
Case (1938) 54 L. Q. REv. 543· 
•• The Statute .of Monopolies, 21 }Ac. I, ch. 3 (1623-24). 
23 Note the survival of the action in tort for "triple damages" in the Sherman Act. Note, too, that 
although "double" the loss might be recovered in private suit, it was not until Senator Hoar rewrote the 
bill in the idioms of the common law that the provision for triple damages appeared. 
•• The Statute of Monopolies was an act both against and for vested privileges. It had the support of 
those who wished to curb the grant of royal favors. It had also support from persons who wished to 
arrest further grants of letters patent lest they encroach upon their own privileges. In the act the decla-
ration of the general rule against restraints is supplied with a formidable list of exceptions. These saving 
clauses extend to public bodies, to gilds of arts, trades and mysteries, and even to private individuals. 
25 CHENEY, INTRODUCTION TO nm INDUSTRIAL AND SOCIAL HIS"I'ORY OF ENGLAND (reV, ed. 1920) 51, 
I GRoss, THE GILD MERCHANT (1890) 43-50. 
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fraternities were open to all who could meet their professional standards. Member-
ship was granted to all who climbed the ladder of apprentice, journeyman and 
master.26 As the man from the next town ceased to be a foreigner, as Flemish 
weavers and continental chymists came over, as national control came to replace local 
regulation, the restrictions in apprenticeship and against artisans from out ·of town 
fell away, and the law made its response. By the middle of the sixteenth century a 
statute of the realm provided that "no person shall interrupt or deny any freeman 
carpenter; plasterer, joyner, hardhewer, sawyer, tiler, glasser, lime:burner; brick 
maker, plumber or laborer born in this realm or made denison to work in any of 
the s.aid crafts in any city, borough or town corporate where he shall work nor be 
free of the same, any statute, law, ordinance or other thing to the contrary notwith-
standing."27 
Soon the courts were finding surviving privilege contrary to the ancient principles 
of the common law. In the classic case of the Comitas Sicissororum et Operor.um. 
Panorum,28 letters patent from the King were not enough, and it was held that a 
qualified tailor, who had not received the gild's blessing, could not be kept from his 
occupation. Young men "ought in their youth ... to learn lawful sciences and trades • 
. . . The common law abhors all monopolies, which prohibit any from working in 
any lawful trade." Apprenticeship is to be severely limited to its term of seven years. 
The· holding of the defendant from the free practice of his trade for a longer period 
is "against the law ... agains~ the liberty and freedom of the subject ... against the 
common law, and the commonwealth."29 
In a nation of shop-keepers the pursuit of a calling became a property protected 
against interference. "He that hinders another in his trade or livelihood is liable to 
an action for so hindering him."30 In time it became an inalienable right of an 
Englishman and eventually even a natural right of man.31 Today it is a common-
place for the courts of England to assert, against proscription by the Crown or col-
lusion of individuals, "the common right of_ freedom of trade."32 
III 
The doctrine of "the common right" to the unmolested pursuit of a calling found 
an easy foothold in America. It was explicit in the corpus taken over from England 
and continental conditions tended to confirm and to strengthen it. It was an expres-
~· I AsHLEY, ENGLISH EcoNoMIC HiSTORY AND THEORY (1906) ch. II. 
27 
2 & 3 Eow. VI, c. 15, §4 (1548). · 
• u Commonly known as the Tailors of Ipswich; supra note 19. 
~9 It is added, "Ordinances for the good order and government of men of •trade and mysteries are 
good, but not to restrain any one in his lawful mystery." Id. at 54a. 
3° Keeble v. Hickeringill, II East. 574n, 575n (1706). 
31 In France the skills of individuals were lifted above gild control and freedom in their exercise was 
set within the order of nature itself. This ideology found expression in legislation. King Louis XVI's Edict 
of 1776 denied that "the right to work is a royal privilege which the King might sell and his subjects 
were bound to purchase from him." Indeed, "God in giving man want and desires rendering labor neces-
sary for their satisfaction, conferred the right to labor upon all men, and this property is the first, most 
sacred of all." 
•• Attorney General of Australia v. Adelaide Steamship Co. [1913] A. C. 781, 794· 
HeinOnline  -- 7 Law & Contemp. Probs. 30 1940
LAw AND CoNTEMPORARY PRoBLEMs 
sion of individual liberty, an aspect of the system of free enterprise, the very epitome 
of "the American way of thought." The Declaration of Independence declared "life, 
liberty, and the pursuit of happiness" to be the property of everyman. "When the 
·Colonies separated from the mother country no privilege was more fully recogJ}ized 
or more completely incorporated into the fundamental law" than the right of the 
individual to "follow any of the known established trades and occupations of the 
country."33 In the various states of the Union callings were open to all who were 
willing to take their chances. The Great Republic was the land of opportunity. 
The Fourteenth Amendment brought the common r(ght into federal law. Here, 
as in England, it was first asserted against a formal grant of monopoly. A reconstruc-
tion legislature of Louisiana dominated by carpet-baggers had conferred upon a 
chartered company a monopoly in the slaughtering of cattle. The butchers, robbed 
of their occupation, appealed to the courts. In their behalf it was argued that the act 
of the state, by the denial of their right to their calling, had abridged their "privileges 
and immunities" as "citizens of the United States."34 The Court was unwilling as 
yet to go so far and by the closest of margins rejected the contention. But an issue 
had been raised which would not down and presently had to be decided all over. 
The butchers, whose plea had been rejected ·by the Court, appealed to the legislature 
and secured the repeal of the obnoxious charter. With fortunes of war and arguments 
reversed, it was this time the chartered company which appealed to the judiciary.86 
Again "the opinion of the court" stood by the legislature. But two justices, who had 
dissented before, now co~curred in the result. They argued, not that the second act 
of the legislature was valid, but that the first all along had been invalid.36 It would, 
however, not do to revive the rhetoric of privileges and immunities; so the common 
right of every man to his ti:a.de was tucked neatly away within the clause which 
forbids a state to deny or abridge life, liberty, or property, "without due process of 
law." 
But two jurists, however bull-headed, are not a majority of a bench of nine. It 
took time, a shifting opinion and the proper cases to allow the doctrine to grow up. 
A classical economics which in the likeness of Newtonian physics made of industry 
an automatic self-operating mechanism was dominant. The common-sense of a 
pioneer nation united with the urges of a rising business community to impress upon 
public policy the philosophy of /pissez faire. A transition from "status" to "contract" 
was in reputable belief the symbol of the march of mind and of culture. Because 
men were coming to think that way the views of two stubborn jurists were quoted 
by lesser judges as if they had been the opinion of the court. In due time the Court 
rebuked state officials who would deny to a heathen Chinee the privilege of carrying 
83 Field, J., dissenting, in Slaughter House Cases, 16 Wall. 36, 105 (1873). 
u The Slaughter House Cases, 16 Wall. 3.6 (1873). For the detailed development of this argument 
and the resulting doctrine, see Hamilton, The Path of Due Process, in READ, THE CoNSTITUTION REcoN-
SIDERED (1938). 
""Butchers' Union Co. v. Crescent City Co., III U. S. 746 (1884). 
88 Field, J., concurring, id. at 754; Bradley J., "cong~rring, id. at 760. 
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on the laundry trade. The "common right" at last had come into its own in the 
name of "the equal protection of the laws."37 Eventually the views of the two con-
trary and concurring brothers were accepted by the Court as canonical.38 As Mr. 
Justice Peckham quoted Mr. Justice Bradley, "the right to follow any of the common 
occupations of life is an inalienable right. It was formulated as such under the 
phrase 'pursuit of happiness' in the Declaration of Independence." With the same 
concurring opinion as authority, he identifies "the liberty of pursuit" with "the right 
to follow any of the ordinary callings" and makes it "a large ingredient in the civil 
liberty of the citizen."39 In a gloss of his own Mr. Justice Peckham explains, "It is 
true that these remarks were made in regard to questions of monopoly, but they well 
describe the rights 'to which are covered by the word. 'liberty' as contained in the 
Fourteenth Amendni~t:"40 The common right to a calling-harking back to 
ancient law and the Statute of Monopolies-becomes the sesame which opens the 
due process clause to judicial interpretation. 
The invocation of the "common right" pointed the path for due process. It 
brought direction to groping justices, supplied a needed philosophy, and enabled the 
bench to breath life into a vague and inviting clause. In days of old the Crown was 
the principal source of monopoly; the legislature had now come into supremacy. 
Against the law-making body could be hurled a sanction which had been designed 
to keep the Stuart kings in their place. This sanction was the common law which 
Lord Coke, Parliament, and Acts of Settlement had elevated above the royal 
prerogative. In a country which grounded its legal system upon a written document, 
the ends it has been invoked to serve could be read into the Constitution itself. Yet 
the common right was no simple thing developing in isolation; it was an aspect of 
a system of usages, a symbol of an organized economy. For if the law accorded to 
one, it accorded to all, the right ot follow the trade of his choice. Crafts demand 
their land, their shops, their tools, and as they adopt the ways of business, the 
apparatus of production becomes elaborate. The freedom in respect to personal 
service has its corollary in a liberty in respect to property. Under a scheme of "indi-
vidual initiative" freedom of contract fills the great office of drawing workmen and 
materials into production, keeping industries going, adjusting the supplies of various 
wares to the wants of men. Group is balanced against group, master against servant, 
lender against borrower, buyer against seller. The urge of the individual towards 
e.-..:travagant profits, excessive wages, stupendous bargains is held in check by others 
of his kind seeking the same advantage. In a word free competition is invoked to 
keep business going, absorb the shock of novelty, do justice between the parties. It 
was not privilege which Peckham, Brewer, Harlan, JJ., sought to enthrone. It was 
not property upon which they sought to confer ·the legal privilege of shaping the 
terms of the bargain. They professed, with little qualification, an economic creed; 
87 Yick Wo v. Hopkins, n8 U. S. 356 (r886). 38 Allgeyer v. Louisiana, r65 U. S. 578 (1897). 
80 I d. at 589-590, quoting Bradley, J., concurring in Butchers' Union v. Crescent City Co., III U. S. 
746, 762. '"ld. at 590. 
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and the empty receptacle of "due process" and the age-old vitality of "the common 
right" enabled them to read "free competition" into the Constitution.41 
The sweep of doctrine appears in epitome in the famous bake-shop case. A statute 
of New York limited the hours of workers in bake-shops to ten in any one day. This 
act the Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Peckham, found to be a deprivation of 
liberty and property without due process of law.42 The rhetoric of the opinion is 
almost that of the law; the underlying logic, which directs the argument straight to 
its goal, is wholly that of economic faith. To the spokesman for the bench the state 
legislature is a irresponsible monarch; the statute-in-question, a grant of immunity; 
the bakers, the beneficiary of privilege. Upon all these the Court, armed with a 
statute of monopolies tucked away within the Fourteenth Amendment, righteously 
descends. The gist of the reasoning. is that there is in the record not one scintilla of 
evidence to indicate that bakers are not like other men-adult males quite able to 
take care of their own interests in the bargaining process. To Mr. Justice Peckham, 
and the four brethren who were in agreement, the dominant point was the lack of 
a demonstration that in respect to the safeguarding of health the mechanism of free 
contract was not adequate. A youth of sixty-two had just come to the Court as 
Mr. Justice Holmes; and he, in probably the most famous dissent ever scribbled, 
supplied the text against which the opinion must be read. The "Constitution is not 
intended to embody a particular economic theory~"43 The majority of his brethren 
were unwilling to allow a state to usurp an industrial office which belonged to free-
dom of contract. 
Some three years later the matter was even more sharply put. The depression of 
the nineties had witnessed a disastrous railroad strike. A Cmigressional intent that 
the incident should not be repeated found expression in a statute providing for an 
, arbitration of differences upon interstate lines between masters and servants.44 A 
section designed to instrument the act forbade any carrier to discharge a workman 
because of his membership in a ~abor union. In a test case this provision was struck 
down by the Court in the name of "due process of law." "The freedom of contract" 
which Mr. Justice Peckham had found in the Fourteenth, was now discovered by 
Mr. Justice Harlan to lie within the Fifth Amendment.45 The spokesman for the 
Court was an enemy of privilege, an ardent tru.stbuster, a champion of the underdog. 
He had dissented in the bake-shop case, believing that bakers were in an unfavorable 
bargaining position, and citing statistics to clinch his point.46 In his mind the legal 
norm of the common right to a calling was reinforced by the prevalent opinion of 
the rural Kentucky in which he had grown up. So, for himself and his court, Mr. 
41 To capture the climate of opinion of the Court in the nineties read: Chicago, Milwnukee and St. 
Paul Ry. Co. v. Minnesota, 134 U. S. 418 (189o); U.S. v. E. C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. I (1895); U.S. v. 
Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U. S. 290 (1897); Smyth v. Ames, 169 U. S. 466 (I8g8); Allgeyer v. 
Louisiana, 165 U. S. 578 (1897). •• Lochner v. New York, 198 U. S. 45 (1905). 
•a Holmes, J., dissenting, id. at 75· Note also evidence in the dissenting opinion of H:trlan, J,, that 
the issue had been decided on an economic theory. . 
•• The Erdman Act, 30 STAT. 424 (1898). 46 Adair v. U. S., 208 U. S. 161 (1908). 
•• Harlan, J., dissenting,. in Lochner v. New York, 198 U. S. 45, 65 (1905). 
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Justice Harlan expressed deep-seated convictions in a language which belonged alike 
to the ancient law, to the Constitution, to common sense, to sound economics. He 
declared that "the right of a person to sell his labor upon such terms as he deems 
proper is, in its essence, the same as the right of the purchaser of labor to prescribe 
the conditions upon which he will accept such labor." In the key of mutuality he 
continues, "so the right of the employee to quit the service of the employer, for what-
e\Ter reason, is the same as the right of the employer, for whatever reason, to dispense 
with the services of such employee." And then crescendo he moves to his climax in 
universal statement, "In all such particulars the employer and the employee have 
equality of right, and any legislation that disturbs that equality is an arbitrary inter-
ference with the liberty of contract which no government can legally justify in a 
free land."47 With the common law as sanction and an American individualist to 
wield the pen, the dogma of classical economics became the voice of the Constitution. 
The common right, of course, could not control its own creation. Rules of law 
have the habit of asserting authority far beyond the sway of the reasons that call 
them into being. The ancient law that came into the "liberty" quickly passed on into 
the "property" of the due process clause. The Court which in the bake-shop case 
assumed the capacity of freedom of contract to do justice between the parties to 
industry presently neglected to look at the operation of competition. Then, as cita-
tions became available, the Court was content to invoke authority and ceased to 
need the support of economic theory.48 
Even within a few years a weakness in bargaining position ceases to be relevant 
~or comes to be regarded as an attribute of property. The shift in reference from the 
system of free competition to the author~ty of "this Court" is clearly apparent in the 
Reports. Mr. Justice Holmes answers Harlan, not in the instant case, but when after 
the lapse of years the issue returns, "a workman not unnaturally may believe that 
only by belonging to a union can he secure a contract that shall be fair to him .... 
If that belief, whether right or wrong, may be held by a reasonabie man, it seems 
to me that it may be enforced by law in order to establish the ·equality of position 
between the parties in which liberty of contract begins."49 To this Mr. Justice Pitney 
made instant retort, "No doubt, wherever the right of private property exists, there 
must and will be inequalities of fortune; and thus it naturally happens that parties 
negotiating about a contract are not equally unhampered by circumstances .... And, 
since it is self-evident that, unless all things are held in common, some persons must 
have more property than others, it is from the nature of things impossible to uphold 
freedom of contract and the right of private property without at the same time 
recognizing as legitimate those inequalities of fortune that are the necessary result of 
n Adair v. U. S., 208 U. S. x6x, 174-5 (1908). Note that Roscoe Pound takes these sentences as his 
text in his classic article, Libdty of Contract (1909) x8 YALE L. J. 454· 
49 Compare with the earlier Lochner v. New\ York, 198 U. S. 45 (1905), or Adair v. U. S., 208 U. S. 
161 (1908), the logic of Hitchman Coal and Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U. S. 229 (1917), and Duplex 
Printing Co. v. Deering, 254 U. S. 443 (1921). 
•• Dissenting in Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U. S. I, 26-27 (1915). 
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the exercise of those rights.";;o After such a leap, citation would suffice for all needful 
reason. 
'fhe doctrine had drifted far from the reasons that had called it into being. It was 
no longer argued that the affairs of industry had best be left to freedom of contract 
between interested parties operating under a system of competition. Instead the dis-
position was to place the ordinary arrangements of business in a domain marked out 
by due process as beyond legislative control. The arrangements of the market place 
had now been committed into the rights of property. A doctrine derived from the 
law against monopoly became a check upon the police power of the state. A sanction 
invoked to outlaw privilege remained to enthrone it. 
IV 
So radical a position was not to be held. It was from the first compromised in the 
failure of the whole court to go along. The call to retreat was sounded long before 
the philosophy set down in dicta had been realized in holdings. In the very state-
ment of a freedom of contract-now grounded in the equities of property rather 
than derived from the forces of competition-there were three sources of weakness 
rather too close to the surface of the dialectic to be kept hidden. The first was the 
instrumental character of the material out of which the theory of legislative im-
potence had been fashioned. Its underlying assumption was, not that business was 
not affected with a public interest, 51 but that competition provided a system of regu-
lation more effective than the government could devise. When agency was forgotten 
and competition degenerated into laissez faire, the edifice began to crumble. The 
second was that in invoking a u~age of the ancient law, another usage of the ancient 
law was overlooked. As old as the right of the individual to his calling was the right 
of the state to regulate. It found expression in ordinance, assize, statute, in the 
judicial notion that price should be reasonable. In the concern of the government for 
health, safety, morals, a police power had been too deeply embedded in the law to 
be forgotten. The third was the curious paradox which attended the development of 
the due process. So long as the appeal was from the legislature to freedom of con-
tract as an agency of social justice, the doctrine was functional. As soon as competi-
tion was forgotten, and freedom from legislative oversight became an attribute of 
property, the function was lost. The anti-monopoly germ came into due process as 
a doom upon immunity; in the refined doctrine it became a bulwark thrown about 
immunity. As circumstance changed, as a knowledge of the character of industrial-
ism grew, as public opinion became sensitive to the evils of capitalism, the weaknesses 
in the structure of due process were laid bare. 
0° For the Court, id. at 17. 
61 One of the most curious of phenomena which attended the reading of laissez faire into constitutional 
law was the doctrine of public interest. An attempt, in respect to the power of the legislature over prices, 
to create a closed category of industries affected with a public interest was without economic foundation, 
rested upon historical error, and defied the rigidities of logic. For the high spots, compare Munn v. 
Illinois, 94 U.S. II3 (1877); Ribnik v. McBride, 277 U. S. 350 (1928); a~d Nebbia v. New York, 291 
u. s. 502 (1934)· 
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An awareness of the character 9f industrialism found expression in an expanding 
oversight of industry. The needs of the people suggested, a growing public opinion 
demanded, the legislature accorded measures of amelioration. In respect to every 
statute, the persons to whom the act was distasteful fell back upon the judiciary as 
the ultimate line of defence. The courts with stern conviction rejected new-fangled 
laws; conducted arguments through intricate constitutional mazes, often of their own 
invention; joyfully placed their imprimatur upon novelties. But whatever the fate 
of an enactment the Constitutional ordeal had to be met. In a campaign that ran 
through many battles, the older sanction of the police power was set against a novel 
immunity in due process. In the struggle fortune was changeable; each doctrine had 
its crescendo and its diminuendo; a rapid surge might be followed by a violent reac-
tion. But even judges of sternest convictions could not stand forever against the 
instant beat of an industrialism, too turbulent to give order, too violent to do justice 
between parties, headed it knew not whither. Legislation as an instrument of control 
might be checked; it could not be outlawed. 
As act took its place beside act, the simple lines of the competitive design dom-
inated the complicated pattern which emerged. There was no idea of abridging the 
common right to a calling, of denying freedom of contract, of deflecting "private 
enterprise" from its orbit. The thought was rather to adjust the system of competi-
tion to the shortcomings which experience had revealed. The norms of "fair" and 
"unfair" were evoked, and in the Clayton Act52 the Congress wrote, and in the 
Robinson-Patm:~:n Act53 revised, rules of the game for the competitive struggle. In-
dustry is a concatenation of processes which must click together. If all its arrange-
ments are at the mercy of a miscellany of individual agreements, the gears can never 
be made to engage. A concert can be secured only through some body of common 
understandings. In instances business may continue to do the trick itself, as it has 
with the standardization of parts, the continuance of market mechanisms, the inven-
tion of vocabularies for various trades. But, if it does not, the state must be called 
upon to make the cogs turn neatly together. Matters are often too deeply affected 
with a public interest for all the terms of the contract to be left to the private parties 
immediately concerned. 
The body politic steps in to prescribe weights and measures, regulate hours of 
Iabor,54 impose employer's liability,55 prevent payments in script,56 prescribe min-
imum rates of wages.l;7 In conserving human resources it prohibits night work for 
womenG8 and outlaws child labor.59 In all such cases freedotp. of contract is set 
02 38 STAT. 730 (1914); 15 U.S. C. §§12-27 (1927). 
03 49 STAT. 1526 (1936); 15 U.S. C. §§13, 13a. 
04 Bunting v. Oregon, 243 U. S. 426 (1917). 
00 Arizona Employers' Liability Cases, 250 U. S. 400 (1919). 
00 McLean v. Arkansas, 2II U. S. 539 (1909). 
01 West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U. S. 379 (1937). 
06 Radice v. New York, 264 U. S. 292 (1924). 
09 There has never been any question of the right of the state to prohibit child labor. Doubts about 
the power of the federal governmc;nt are now probably without foundation. If Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 
U.S. 251 (1918), has nc.t been overruled, it seems clearly to have been outmoded. 
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within a matrix of arrangements prescribed by authority. The lack of bargaining 
power on the part of weaker groups has been recognized. The protection of govern-
ment h-as been accorded to trade unions60 and to farmers' cooperatives towards dis-
posing of their se~vices and products through an orderly proce~s of collective bar-
gaiQing. The aid of the government has been accorded to the milk61 and the 
bituminous coal62 industries to help competition over the hard places. A loss of 
foreign markets has played hob with the orderly growing. of staple crops and the 
market has been unable to adjust ·production to a falling demand. Congress has 
come to the rescue with an agricultural adjustment act designed to effect stability 
in a period of rapid transition.63 It is only in respect to public utilities that the lines 
of control seriously depart from the competitive norm. Even there the competitive 
ideal is retained, and a commission is set up to safeguard the interests which free 
enterprise can no'·longer serve. The topography of public control may be intricate; 
the detail of many designs may lie on its face. Yet in stark outline it still exhibits 
the bold lines of the competitive pattern. 
v 
Accordingly a simple rationale relates the Sherman Act to other statutes and 
draws various measures for the regulation of industry into an articulate whole. The 
hub from which the pattern of control radiates is the general rule against restraints. 
Its ban rests upon all persons; its prohibition lies against every act of the type at 
which it is aimed. It has no distinctive domain, no area of the national economy is 
exempt from its operation; the members of no class, caste, group are saved from its 
command.64 Like trespass, assault, deceit, wanton negligence, it is an offense of 
which any person may be guilty. The rule against restraints, like all wrongs recog-
nized at common law, is universal in!ts sweep. 
An exclusion from the rule against restraints is the kind of thing known to the 
common law as an immunity. Since time immemorial the authority of the King, 
Crown, State has been regarded as general. A privilege, perquisite, immunity, ex-
ception has always taken the form of a writing in which the "liberty" or "liberties" 
granted have in explicit terms been specified and defined.65 Even "ancient liberties" 
-dating far back, thoroughly established, quite unchallenged-were eventually com-
60 National Labor Relations Bd. v. Jones 8t Laughlin Steel Corp. 301 U. S. I (1937). 
61 Nebbia v. New York, 291 U. S. 502 (1934). 
62 Bituminous Coal Act of 1937, 50 STAT. 72 (1937), 15 U. S. C. c. 17B. 
63 See Mulford v. Smith, 307 U. S. 38, 42 (1939). 
6
' "The Sherman Act is a broad enactment prohibiting unreasonable restraints upon interstate com· 
merce, and monopolization, or attempts to monopolize, with penal sanctions." Hughes, C. J., in U. S. v. 
The Borden Co., 6o Sup. Ct. 182, 188 (1939). 
6" Note, for example, the liberty of the Prior of Dunstall, Y. B., II Hen. VI, f. 19, pl. 13; the crown 
grant of a market "with all liberties and free customs" pertaining thereto to "the abbey and convent of 
Ramsey," 2 CARTULARIUMS, MONASTARII DE RAMESEIA (R.S.) (1886) 298; the liberties of the merchant 
gild of Berwick-upon-Tweed, TouLMIN SMITH, ENGLISH GUILDS (r87o) 338-346; the privilege and 
liberties of the College of Physicians of the City of London, GooDALL, HISTORY OF THE COLLEGE OF 
PHYSiciANs OF LoNDON. See Thorne, The Constitution and the Courts:· a Reexamination of the Pamollt 
Case of Dr. Bonham, in READ, THE CoNSTITUTION REcoNslpERED (1938). 
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mitted to parchment. Thus lords of the realm, ecclesiastical establishments, munic-
ipalities, fraternities, mysteries, colleges of physicians, honorable companies had each 
its distinctive prerogatives. As responsible government developed, the legislature 
replaced the Crown. Privilege, to be valid against or an exception to, the general 
law, had to be confirmed by Act of Parliament. 
A concern to safeguard the rule against restraints was at the very heart of the 
movement towards statutory sanction. Here the creative period for Anglo-American 
law is the seventeenth century. From the accession of James I to the abdication of 
James II, royal provocation and legislative response, political act and military event, 
beat upon the Constitution to level ancient rights into a general law before which 
all men are equal. In .this era the liberties of towns, fraternities, mysteries, individuals 
were transformed. The miscellany of specific perquisites within the commonwealth 
which the plural "liberties" connoted was converted into the abstract singular 
"liberty." This verbal receptacle-never sharply defined, never reduced to a list of 
particulars-came to provide a domicile for such liberties as belonged to all subjects 
and were consonant with the legal principle of equality before the law. Such liberties, 
now aspects of a large and more dominant "liberty," were grounded upon sanctions 
far more enduring than letters patent, a royal charter, or even a parliamentary statute. 
Before the century was done the particulars which make up liberty had become the 
inalienable rights of Englishmen. A century later they were definitely established 
in an order of nature as the rights of men. Meanwhile liberties-ancient or usurped 
-which could not be translated into universal rights had a strong presumption set 
over against them. Many were too deeply entrenched within the social fabric to 
yield at once to the demands of constitutional government.66 But such liberties came 
presently to be recognized as immunities. The. royal pleasure, however explicit its 
manifestation, was no longer a lawful warrant:, It was everywhere exposed to the 
general law. The will of the legislature was necessary to its security. 
When the Sherman Act was being debated, it was understood that its prohibitions 
were personal and general; that exception and limitation are created only by legis-
lative act. As the statute took shape, questions of the immunity of laborers and of 
farmers in respect to certain forms of collective activity were repeatedly raised.67 At 
one time an immunity was written into the bill in favor of a process of collective 
bargaining whose objectives were to lower hours and to raise wages. A similar 
amendment excepted farmers' cooperatives in activities concerned with "the primary 
scale of their products."68 As the current Act was shaped by the Judiciary Com-
mittee, they went down with the bill into which they had been incorporated. 
00 Note, for instance, the liberties preserved to towns, companies, and even individuals by the Statute 
of Monopolies. 
67 See e.g. 21 CoNG. REc. 2560-2562, 2565, 2571, 26o6, 2654-2655, 2727, 2728 (xSgo). 
cs "That this act shall nof be construed to apply to any arrangements, agreements, or combinations 
between ·the laborers, made with a view of lessening the number of hours of labor or the increasing of 
their wages: nor to any arrangements, agreements, or combinations among persons engaged in horticulture 
or agriculture made with a view of enhancing the prices of their own agricultural or horticultural prod-
ucts." S. x, as amended, 51st Cong., xst Sess. (x8go). 
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As statute after statute has accommodated the competition pattern to the actualities 
of industry, exception has been by explicit grant. In every enactment the department 
from the rule against restraints has been severely limited. In object, activity, opera-
tion, the Act of Congress is held to its province; it is hedged about with precautions 
which keep it from becoming a general immunity. Thus the Webb Export Trade 
Act exempts from the charge of illegality under the Sherman Law "an association 
entered into for the sole purpose of engaging in export trade and actually engaged 
solely in such export trade."69 The Wagner Act,70 with trim lines and clear-cut 
intent, does not exempt trade unions from the prohibitions of the antitrust law. 
Instead it provides an orderly rubric fC?r collective agreement about hours, wages and 
conditions of employment. Outside of the ordained procedure, which is subjected 
to the oversight of a regulatory body, the activities of laborers, even when done under 
trade union auspices, are subject to the general law. The statutes designed to insure 
to farmers fair prices are of similar kind. They offer protection in the primary sale 
of wheat, corn, cotton, hogs, dairy products. But they are drawn with a scrupulous 
regard for the objectives of the Sherm~n Act. The Capper-Volstead Act71 provides 
that "if the Secretary of Agriculture shall have reason to believe that such association 
monopolizes or restrains trade in interstat~ or foreign commerce to such an extent 
that the price of any agricultural product is unduly enhanced," he shall through the 
necessary steps of complaint, notice, hearing, and order cause it "to cease and desist 
from monopolization or restraint of trade." In the Agricultural Marketing Agree-
ment Act, 72 the immunities granted are detailed, and the rule against restraints con-
tinues to fix the limits of tolerance.73 In the Fisheries Cooperative Marketing Act a 
similar power to proceed, if activities cross the line of legal tolerance, is granted to 
the Secretary of Commerce.74 In this sheaf of cooperative legislation, the power of 
initiation is conferred upon an official other than the Attorney General, but the 
ancient ban upon restraints is not relaxed. 
In a number of instances when~ it is manifest that competition does not do the 
job, Congress has resorted to another type of regulatory device. Even before the 
Sherman Act was passed a commission was established for the regulation of the 
railroads. As the logic of the new arrangement became obvious, the carriers were 
relieved from the operation of the antitrust laws "in so far as may be necessary to 
enable them to do anything authorized or required" by an order of the Interstate 
Commerce Commission.75 It is of note that it was not until after the regulatory 
09 There are the further provisions that "such association, agreement, or act is not in restraint of trade 
within the United States" and "such association does not, either in the United States or elsewhere, enter 
into any agreement, understanding, or, conspiracy, or do any act which artificially or intentionally enhances 
or depresses prices within the United States." 40 STAT. sx6, 517 (191S), 15 u. s. c. §62. 
10 49 STAT. 449 (1935), 29 U. S. C. C. 7· 11 42 STAT. 3SS (1922), 7 U. S. C. §292. 
12 50 STAT. 246, 249 (1937), 7 U. S. C. §§6oSb, 671 (d). 
13 "The Agricultural Act is a limited statute with specific reference to particular transactions which 
may be regulated by official action in a prescribed manner •••• If Congress had desired to grant any 
further immunity, Congress doubtless would have said so." Hughes, C. J., in United States v. The Borden 
Co., 6o Sup. Ct. 1S2, xSS (1939). 
14 4S STAT. 1214 (1934), 15 U. S. C. §522. 1G 4S STAT. 215 (1933), 49 U. S, C. §5(15), 
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system had been fully matured that the verbal defenses of the Sherman Act were 
relaxed.70 Under the Shipping Act certain agreements are excepted from the Sherman 
Act; but it is unlawful to carry out such understandings without the approval of the 
Shipping Board,77 which has authority to accept, to reject, or to modify. Of like 
effect, and for reasons peculiar to the business, is the saving clause written into the 
Marine Insurance Association Act.78 In all such cases the public interest is as clearly 
and fully recognized as under the antitrust laws. But motor carriers, railroads, ship-
ping, and things relating thereto, have ways of their own and places quite unique 
in the natural economy. So a public authority is set up the better to impose the public 
interest which a primitive competition seems powerless to promote. 
A simple, definite, common-sense system of values shapes this series of measures 
which impresses a public policy upon the national economy. Its dominant principlef 
are equality before the law and the common rule against restraints. There is, in the 
instance, much accommodation of requirements to the realities of the industrial order. 
But in the whole structure of legislation, there is little of recognized privilege or of 
immunity from the general law. The seeming exceptions, under examination, turn 
out to be no more than departures to effect adjustments of the common rule to dis-
tinctive circumstances. These departures fall roughly into two distinct classes: ( 1) 
the provision of some agency of public interest where circumstance renders competi-
tion an undependable instrument and (2) the indulgence of a limited collective 
activity to groups whose individual members are in a bargaining position inferior to 
that of the parties with whom they must deal. Laborers and farmers habitually 
accept contracts whose terms they have little power to shape. Legislation concerned 
with collective bargaining and cooperative marketing aims to help the worker and 
the farmer up to the plane upon which competition is presumed to do its work. But 
it is from such a plane that monopoly, combination, conspiracy reaches up after that 
which is illegal. The very statutes, which attempt to elevate weaker groups to the 
cqmpetitive plane, se_ek by the most express commands to hold them there. Rarely 
has a rule· of the general law been so zealously guarded against exception and 
immunity. 
VI 
Thus was fashioned and fortified against immunities the legal ban on restraints. 
It dates from the period in which the supremacy of the law was asserted over the 
arbitrary will of the Crown. It is an instrument through which the royal pleasure 
was curbed, privilege fell before the common rule; all men-irrespective of class, 
caste, rank, wealth, profession, calling-were made equal before the law. The prin-
ciple of "equal protection of the laws" has become an axiom of Anglo-American 
jurisprudence. It finds explicit statement in the Federal Constitution and the con-
stitutions of tl1e several states. It is embedded in the great corpus of the law reports. 
Its place in the structure of justice is far too obvious to invite elaboration or to 
demand citation. 
70 Note also similar provisions in the Motor Carrier Act, 49 STAT. 543 (1935), 49 U. S. C. §313£. 
11 39 STAT. 733 (1916), 46 U. S. C. §814. 78 41 STAT. 1000 (1929), 46 U. S. C. §885. 
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It is significant that a high place within the law was early accorded to the right 
to a calling. A man could not, with a threat to his livelihood or to the common good, 
barter it away.79 In protecting it against royal grant, monopoly or co~lusive conduct, 
he was entitled to his action. Once upon a time a gild, a university, a college of 
physicians, an honorable company, had its own system of poli,ce, with the rights of 
license, search and seizure, presentment and trial, fine and imprisonment, all the 
perquisites of effective discipline. Now the larger office has been taken over by the 
state, and in respect to trades, callings, occupations, fraternities, corporations, and 
even religious bodies, a private police is legally taboo.80 Men may freely band them-
selves in association, but their by-laws must not encroach upon the law of the land. 
The age of benefit of clergy is gone and an ancient privilege i~ not likely to be revived 
to the advantage of a more secular calling. 
In the Sherman Act, as at common law, the offense is specified, but is not reduced 
to a catalogue of particulars. This is in accord with the spirit of an institution which 
aims to contrive instruments flexible enough to meet the demands for justice under 
shifting circumstances. Public policy must of necessity find e."pression in the most 
general terms. The objectives of the federal government are set down in a handful 
of prepositional phrases. The general objective of domestic legislation is "the com-
mon good" or "the general welfare." The police power, which keeps in order the 
affairs ~f a nation, aims at nothing more specific than public morals, public safety, 
public health. The provisions of the Sherman Act are written in the most general 
language, broad enough to meet all sorts of conditions, flexible enough to compre-
hend situations as they arise. 
In every case hot from the affairs of business, the appeal is to the reasonable man. 
And with· the reason of the common law-and its zone of discretion-the processes 
of justice cannot dispense. As time passes callings become businesses, occupations 
come and are gone, restraints alter in magnitude and character. To keep abreast of 
the times an industrY undergoes constant revision in technology, organization, cor-
porate structure, trade practices, marketing methods. To set down a prohibition as 
a detail of "thou shalt nots" is to· stage an adventure into futility. Forbidden things 
will soon be done in unforbidden ways and presently the prohibitions apply only to 
70 An individual sells his trade, his business, his practice to another. The value of the assets which 
pass depends upon the withdrawal of the seller. He agrees not to resume his occupation within a specified 
area and over a certain span of years. A breach of contract provokes a suit which is met with a plea that 
the restrictive covenant is void as against public policy. In the cases the right of the individual to do as 
he will with his own is set over against the harm he th:reatens to the public interest. The more replaceable 
the worker, the less skilled the occupation, the less of a necessity the commodity, the less strategic tht' 
industry, the more heavily the balance tips toward individual advantage. The more unique the craftsman, 
the more learned the mystery, the more necessary the service, the greater the compulsion. If an essential 
service to the community is at stake, a man cannot, of his own will and to his own advantqge, bargain 
away his right to his trade. Leading cases are Mitchell v. Reynolds, I P. Wms. 181, 24 Eng. Rep. 347 
(17II); Hitchcock v! Coper, 6 Ad. & E. 438, II2 Eng. Rep. 167 (1837); Union Strawboard Co. v. Bon• 
field, 193, Ill. 420, 61 N. E. 1038 (1901); Diaq1ond Match Co. v. Roeber, 106 N. Y. 473, 13 N. E. 419 
(1.887); Von Bremen v. MacMonnies, 2oo' N. Y. 41, 93 N. E. 186 (1910); Oregon Steam Navigation Co. 
v. Winsor, 20 Wall. 64 (U. S. 1873). 
80 This is not to say that such systems of private police do not exist. Any student of industries or any 
attorney who has followed antitrust cases for a period of years can recite numerous examples. 
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that which has ceased to be. As the national economy is transformed, such a pro-
cedure would quickly leave a wider and wider territory without the law. The gen-
eral words of the act, with reason to direct, arrest and appoint limits, prevent the 
command from being frozen into obsolescence. The rule against restraints indicates 
clearly the type of activity to which tolerance is not to be accorded. As with other 
ordinances which announce policy, the application of the rule awaits the specific 
occasion. As the concrete issue is met, the antitrust law comes to grips with current 
reality. 
The standard is definite enough to meet the requirements of justice. As with any 
other general rule, when the norm of restraint of trade is laid against a course of 
conduct, there are borderline cases. Here, because of the complicated character of 
the practices under review and the balance of values involved in judgment, they are 
often more than usually perplexing. But however difficult extreme cases may prove, 
the principles that should resolve them have been clearly proclaimed. Nor are they 
sheer abstractions for whose meaning public officials and courts must fumble. They 
have emerged from the concretions of litigation, out of a medley of human tangles, 
over a span of centuries. A contract which imposes a restraint upon trade may be 
upheld or struck down. If upheld the reason is, as stated by a wise judge years ago, 
"not because they are advantageous to the individual," but "because it is for the 
benefit of the public at large that they be enforced."81 Or, as another able jurist has 
put it, the agreement is reasonable if "the restraint is such only as to afford a fair 
protection to the interests of the party in favor· of whom it is given, and not so large as 
to interfere with the interests of the public."82 The state cannot allow private parties 
to bargain or conspire away the advantage which the community has in access to 
members of a calling or in a competition for its patronage. 
The Sherman Act is thus in accord with the great American tradition. Callings 
are by law open to all; men have a right to buy and sell in a free and open market. 
Yet the competitive system is not the ultimate word in industrial order; nor is it a 
definitive answer to all the problems of the national economy. Already an elaborate 
structure of statutes testifies to its shortcomings in operation. It may be that in the 
near future we must seriously depart from its pattern to serve the public interest. 
But, e'!en in modification and departure, the norm of social justice embodied in the 
rule against restraints may not cease to be a guide. In any venture into regulation 
every party has a right to insist that it be accorded an equivalent for the protection 
of the open market which he is called upon to surrender. In a world where the 
unknown crowds upon us, public policy ca!l have no enduring ultimate. For. its 
guidance we may discover a more reasonable scheme of values than we now know. 
But until that time, the objectives of the common right and the Sherman Act must 
continue to direct. However the pattern of industrial government is modified, the 
ideal they embody will remain the reference for economic justice. 
81 Baron Parke, in Malian v. May, II Mees. & W • ., 653, 665, 152 Eng. Rep. 967, 972 (1843). 
82 Nordenfelt v. Maxim Nordenfelt & Co. [1894] A. C. 535, 567. 
